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Abstract—The Bertrand Oligopoly situation with Shu-
bik’s demand functions is modelled as a cooperative TU
game. For that purpose two optimization problems are
solved to arrive at the description of the worth of any
coalition in the so-called Bertrand Oligopoly Game. Under
certain circumstances, this Bertrand oligopoly game has
clear affinities with the well-known notion in statistics
called variance with respect to the distinct marginal costs.
This Bertrand Oligopoly Game is shown to be totally
balanced, but fails to be convex unless all the firms
have the same marginal costs. Under the complementary
circumstances, the Bertrand Oligopoly Game is shown
to be convex and in addition, its Shapley value is fully
determined on the basis of linearity applied to an appealing
decomposition of the Bertrand Oligopoly Game into the
difference between two convex games, besides two non-
essential games. One of these two essential games concerns
the square of one non-essential game.
Index Terms—Bertrand Oligopoly situation, Bertrand
Oligopoly Game, Convexity, Shapley Value, Total Bal-
ancedness.
I. INTRODUCTION
A central problem in oligopoly theory is the existence
of collusive behaviors between firms, that is, situations in
which firms are able to coordinate and to stabilize their
strategies in order to increase their profits. The classi-
cal Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly situations are such
examples where firms are better off through cooperation
rather than by acting independently. A cartel operating
successfully is the OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries) cartel which restricts oil supply in
order to control oil price market. Another example of
a cartel which had operated is the agreement between
multinational firms Saint-Gobain, Pilkington, Asahi and
Soliver in flat glass industry. Their illegal agreement on
the price of glass in the car industry from 1998 to 2003
had been fined by the European Commission in 2008.
Non-cooperative game theory has provided the theoreti-
cal bases for the existence of collusive behaviors between
firms by means of repeated games. Under this approach,
each firm does not have any interest in defecting from the
collusive behavior because it rationally anticipates future
punishments in the periods following its defection. We
refer to Pepall et al. (2008) for an overview on this topic.
An alternative way to formalize the existence of collusive
behaviors comes from cooperative game theory. Under
this approach, firms are allowed to sign binding agree-
ments in order to form cartels called coalitions. With
such an assumption cooperative games called oligopoly
TU(Transferable Utility)-games can be defined and the
existence of collusive behaviors is then related to the
non-emptiness of the core of such games. Aumann(1959)
proposes two approaches in order to define cooperative
game: according to the first, every cartel computes
the total profit which it can guarantee itself regardless
of what outsiders do; the second approach consists
in computing the minimal profit for which outsiders
can prevent the firms in the cartel from getting more.
These two assumptions lead to consider the α and β-
characteristic functions respectively. In this article, we
follow this cooperative approach to analyze collusive
behaviors and we study a subclass of oligopoly TU-
games in α and β-characteristic function forms. Many
works have studied the core of oligopoly TU-games. As
regards Cournot oligopoly TU-games with or without
transferable technologies, Zhao (1999a,b) shows that the
α and β-characteristic functions lead to the same class
of Cournot oligopoly TU-games. When technologies
are transferable, Zhao(1999a) provides a necessary and
sufficient condition to establish the convexity property in
2case the inverse demand function and cost functions are
linear. Although these games may fail to be convex in
general, Norde et al. (2002) show they are nevertheless
totally balanced. When technologies are not transferable,
Zhao(1999b) proves that the core of such games is non-
empty if every individual profit function is continuous
and concave. Furthermore, Norde et al.(2002) show that
these games are convex in case the inverse demand
function and cost functions are linear, and Driessen
and Meinhardt(2005) provide economically meaningful
sufficient conditions to guarantee the convexity property
in a more general case.
As regards Bertrand oligopoly TU-games, Deneckere
and Davison (1985) consider a Bertrand oligopoly sit-
uation with differentiated products in which the demand
system is Shubik’s (1980) and firms operate at a constant
and identical marginal and average cost. They prove that
these games have a superadditive property in the sense
that a merger of two disjoint cartels results in a joint
after-merger profit for them which is greater than the sum
of their pre-merger profits. Lardon(2010) extends this
result by considering the α and β-characteristic functions
of these games. As for Cournot oligopoly TU-games,
he shows that the α and β-characteristic functions lead
to the same class of Bertrand oligopoly TU-games and
proves that the convexity property holds for this class of
games.
In this article, we study Bertrand oligopoly TU-games
in α and β-characteristic function forms with Shubik’s
demand functions in which firms have possibly distinct
marginal costs. We prove that the α and β-characteristic
functions lead to the same class of Bertrand oligopoly
TU-games, and so we extend Lardon ’s result (2010)
which holds only with identical marginal costs of firms.
For this class of games, we show that if the intercept
of demand is sufficiently small, then Bertrand oligopoly
TU-games share clear similarities with a well-known
notion in statistics called variance with respect to the
distinct marginal costs. Such games are shown to be
totally balanced, but fail to be convex unless all the
firms have the same marginal costs. Moreover, we prove
that if the intercept of demand is sufficiently large,
then Bertrand oligopoly TU-games are convex and in
addition, the Shapley value is fully determined on the
basis of linearity applied to an appealing decomposition
of Bertrand oligopoly TU-games into the difference
between two convex games, besides two non-essential
games. One of these two convex games is defined as the
square of one of the two non-essential games.
This article is structured as follows. In section 2, we
introduce the model and show that Bertrand oligopoly
TU-games in β-characteristic function form with distinct
marginal costs are well-defined. Moreover, we prove that
the α and β-characteristic functions lead to the same
class of Bertrand oligopoly TU-games. In section 3, we
show that if the intercept of demand is sufficiently large,
then Bertrand oligopoly TU-games are convex. In section
4, we study and characterize the Shapley value on the
class of Bertrand oligopoly TU-games. In section 5, we
show that if the intercept of demand is sufficiently small,
then Bertrand oligopoly TU-games fail to be convex but
are nevertheless totally balanced. Section 6 gives some
concluding remarks.
II. THE NON-SYMMETRIC BERTRAND OLIGOPOLY
TU-GAME WITH SHUBIK’S DEMAND FUNCTIONS
A Bertrand oligopoly situation is described by a 3-
tuple 〈N, (Di)i∈N , (Ci)i∈N 〉, where N = {1, 2, . . . , n}
is the finite set of firms, such that, for every firm i ∈ N ,
the Shubik’s demand function Di : Rn+ → R and the
(linear) cost function Ci : R+ → R+ with marginal cost
ci ≥ 0 respectively are given by ([9])
Di(p1, p2, . . . , pn) = V −pi−r ·
[
pi− 1n ·
∑
k∈N
pk
]
·x (1)
and Ci(x) = ci for all x ∈ R+ where pi is the price
charged by firm i, the demand’s intercept V ≥ 0 when
all prices are zero, and let r > 0 be the substitutability
parameter. When r approaches zero, products become
unrelated, and when r approaches infinity, products
become perfect substitutes. The quantity demanded of
firm i’s brand depends on its own price pi and the
difference between its own price and the average price
in the industry. The latter quantity is decreasing with
respect to its own price pi and increasing with respect
to any price pj , j 6= i. Notice that firms may operate
at possibly different marginal costs ci ≥ 0, i ∈ N , and
these marginal costs do not limit the non-negative prices
pi ≥ 0, i ∈ N , of firms.
The corresponding Bertrand Oligopoly Game in normal
form 〈N, (Xi)i∈N , (pii)i∈N 〉 is given by player i’s strat-
egy set Xi = R+ = [0,∞) and individual profit function
pii : Πk∈NXk → R such that
pii(p1, p2, . . . , pn) = (pi − ci) ·Di(p1, p2, . . . , pn)
So, for all i ∈ N ,
pii(p1, p2, . . . , pn)
= (pi − ci) ·
[
V − (1 + r) · pi + rn ·
∑
k∈N
pk
]
(2)
Denote for any T ⊆ N , T 6= ∅, the coalitional strategy
set XT = Πk∈TXk and define the coalitional profit
3function piT : XT × XN\T → R by piT (pT , pN\T ) =∑
k∈T
pik(pT , pN\T ), for all (pT , pN\T ) ∈ XT × XN\T .
The corresponding Bertrand Oligopoly Game in α- and
β-characteristic function form 〈N, vα〉 and 〈N, vβ〉 are
defined, for every coalition S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, as follows:
vα(S) = max
pS∈XS
min
pN\S∈XN\S
piS(pS , pN\S) (3)
vβ(S) = min
pN\S∈XN\S
max
pS∈XS
piS(pS , pN\S) (4)
piS(pS , pN\S) =
∑
j∈S
pij(pS , pN\S)
=
∑
j∈S
(pj − cj) ·
[
V − (1 + r) · pj + rn ·
∑
k∈N
pk
]
(5)
Generally speaking, it always holds vα(S) ≤ vβ(S) as
well as vα(N) = vβ(N). In the remainder we pay atten-
tion to the Bertrand oligopoly game in β-characteristic
function form and let c¯S = 1s ·
∑
j∈S
cj denote the average
coalitional cost of coalition S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅.
Theorem 2.1: Fix coalition S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, and
strategy profile pN\S ∈ XN\S .
(i) Concerning the maximization program
maxpS∈XS piS(pS , pN\S), the first order conditions
are given by ∂piS∂pi (pS , pN\S) = 0 for all i ∈ S and
its unique solution p¯Si is given by
p¯Si = p¯S +
ci
2 for all i ∈ S, where (6)
p¯S =
1
2 ·
[n·V+r· ∑
k∈N\S
pk
n+r·(n−s)
]
(7)
(ii) Concerning the quadratic minimization program
minpN\S∈XN\S piS((p¯Sj )j∈S , pN\S), where S 6= N ,
its solution is given by
∑
k∈N\S
p¯k = max
[
0, 1r ·
[[
n+r·(n−s)
]
·c¯S−n·V
]]
(8)
We distinguish two cases.
(iii) If n · V ≤ [n+ r · (n− s)] · c¯S , then the following
holds: for all i ∈ S,
p¯Si =
c¯S + ci
2
and p¯S =
c¯S
2
(9)∑
k∈N\S
p¯k =
1
r ·
[[
n+ r · (n− s)
]
· c¯S − n · V
]
(10)
vβ(S) =
1+r
4 ·
[∑
j∈S
(cj)
2 − s · (c¯S)2
]
= 1+r4 ·
∑
j∈S
[
cj − c¯S
]2
(11)
(iv) If n · V > [n+ r · (n− s)] · c¯S , then the following
holds: for all i ∈ S
p¯Si =
1
2 ·
[
n·V
n+r·(n−s) + ci
]
> c¯S+ci2 (12)∑
k∈N\S
p¯k = 0 (13)
vβ(S) =
s
4·n · (n·V )
2[
n+r·(n−s)
] − V2 · ∑
j∈S
cj +
+ 1+r4 ·
∑
j∈S
(cj)
2 − r4·n ·
[∑
j∈S
cj
]2
(14)
= s4·n ·
[
n·V−
[
n+r·(n−s)
]
·c¯S
]2
[
n+r·(n−s)
] +
+ 1+r4 ·
[∑
j∈S
(cj)
2 − s · (c¯S)2
]
(15)
Remark 2.1: With every collection C = (ci)i∈N of
marginal costs, there is associated the so-called Variance
TU game 〈N,V ARC〉 of which the characteristic func-
tion V ARC : P(N) → R is defined by V ARC(∅) = 0
and
V ARC(S) =
∑
j∈S
[
cj − c¯S
]2
for all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅.
(16)
The notion of variance is well-known in the field of
statistics and it refers to the deviations by individuals
from the average coalitional cost measured as the sum
of squares of member’s deviations. According to (11),
the Bertrand Oligopoly Game resembles the associated
Variance TU game. For instance, if the marginal costs
are given by c1 = c2 = c and c3 = c + 1. Then
the zero-normalized three-firm Variance Game is given
by v(S) = 0 if 3 6∈ S and v(S) = s−1s if 3 ∈ S.
That is, v({1, 2}) = 0, v({1, 3}) = v({2, 3}) = 12 and
4v(N) = 23 . Note that firms 1 and 2 are substitutes in this
variance game.
Generally speaking, if i ∈ N and S ⊆ N , S 3 i,
satisfy ci = c¯S , then it follows immediately ci = c¯S\{i}
and in turn, V ARC(S\{i}) = V ARC(S). Particularly, if
i ∈ N satisfies ci = c¯N , then it holds V ARC(N) −
V ARC(N\{i}) = 0. Because the latter expression
represents an upper bound for the core of the zero-
normalized Variance game, any core allocation to player
i degenerates to zero, provided the marginal cost of
firm i coincides with the average grand coalitional cost.
Nevertheless, in Section V we prove the balancedness for
Variance TU games (or equivalently, the non-emptiness
of the core).
Corollary 2.1: Consider the symmetric Bertrand
Oligopoly Game 〈N, vβ〉 in that ci = c > 0 for all
i ∈ N . Fix coalition S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅.
(i) If n · V ≤ [n + r · (n − s)] · c, then vβ(S) = 0 due to
p¯Si = c for all i ∈ S.
(ii) Define the proportionally aggregate netto demand E
through r ·c ·E = n ·(V −c). If n ·V > [n+r ·(n−s)] ·c,
then
vβ(S) =
s
4·n ·
[
n·V−
[
n+r·(n−s)
]
·c
]2
[
n+r·(n−s)
] > 0 (17)
or equivalently, if E > n− s, then
vβ(S) =
s
4·n · (r · c)2 ·
[
E−(n−s)
]2
[
n+r·(n−s)
] > 0 (18)
The non-zero coalitional worth in the symmetric
Bertrand Oligopoly Game depends on the validity of
the constraint n · V > [n + r · (n − s)] · c involving
the intercept V or the equivalent constraint E > n − s
involving the proportionally aggregate netto demand E.
In this setting, we interpret n · (V − c) as the aggregate
netto demand when prices are zero. Obviously, if a
coalition S of size s meets the constraint E ≤ n − s
yielding zero worth vβ(S) = 0, then any coalition of the
same size s or less inherits the same constraint yielding
zero worth. Similarly, if a coalition T of size t meets
the inverse constraint E > n−t yielding non-zero worth
vβ(T ) > 0, then any coalition of the same size or more
inherits the same inverse constraint yielding non-zero
worth. According to (19), the per-capita worth vβ(S)s is
strategically equivalent to the quotient of the square of
a bankruptcy game (with estate E and unitary claims)
and a linearly decreasing symmetric game (varying
from levels (1 + r) · n down to level n).
The non-symmetric Bertrand Oligopoly Game consists
of two types of coalitions because the validity of the
relevant constraint n · V > [n + r · (n − s)] · c¯S
involves the average coalitional cost c¯S . According to
(11), if the average coalitional cost is sufficiently large,
then the coalitional worth is fully determined by the
multiple 1+r4 of the Variance TU Game induced by the
distinct marginal costs. Otherwise, according to (14), if
the average coalitional cost is sufficiently small, then
the coalitional worth in the non-symmetric Bertrand
Oligopoly Game counts, besides the associated variance,
the non-zero worth in the symmetric Bertrand Oligopoly
Game, with the understanding that the constant marginal
cost is to be replaced by the average coalitional cost. The
rather appealing alternative decomposition (14) into four
types of games will be exploited in the Sections IV and
V.
Proof of Theorem 2.1
Part 1. Let i ∈ S. The partial derivative of the
coalitional profit function (5) is as follows:
∂piS
∂pi
(pS , pN\S)
=
[
V − (1 + r) · pi + rn ·
∑
k∈N
pk
]
+
+ (pi − ci) ·
[
−(1 + r) + rn
]
+
∑
j∈S\{i}
(pj − cj) · rn
= V − (1 + r) · (2 · pi − ci) +
+ rn ·
∑
j∈S
(pj − cj) + rn ·
∑
k∈N
pk
Consequently, the solution to the first order condition
∂piS
∂pi
= 0 satisfies, for all i ∈ S,
pi =
ci
2 +
1
2·(1+r) ·
[
V + rn ·
[∑
j∈S
(pj − cj) +
∑
k∈N
pk
]]
.
So far, we conclude that for the solution to the
first order conditions (associated with the maximization
program) it holds that pi− ci2 is constant for all i ∈ S, say
pi− ci2 = p¯S for every i ∈ S. Through substitution in the
latter expression, we arrive at the following relationships:
2 · (1 + r) · p¯S
= V + rn ·
[ ∑
k∈N\S
pk +
∑
j∈S
(2 · pj − cj)
]
= V + rn ·
[ ∑
k∈N\S
pk + 2 · s · p¯S
]
5Rewriting the latter equality yields[
2 · (1 + r)− 2·r·sn
]
· p¯S = V + rn ·
∑
k∈N\S
pk
and thus, p¯S = 12 ·
[n·V+r· ∑
k∈N\S
pk
n+r·(n−s)
]
Recall that the
solution p¯Si to the first order conditions is given by
p¯Si = p¯S +
ci
2 for all i ∈ S.
Part 2. First method.
For the sake of the minimization program
minpN\S∈XN\S piS((p¯Sj )j∈S , pN\S), we derive from
(5) that its objective function reduces as follows:
piS((p¯
S
j )j∈S , pN\S)
=
∑
j∈S
(p¯Sj − cj) ·
[
V − (1 + r) · p¯Sj +
+ rn ·
∑
k∈S
p¯Sk +
r
n ·
∑
k∈N\S
pk
]
(19)
Note that, by (6), each partial derivative of p¯Si , i ∈ S, is
the same, given by
∂p¯Si
∂p`
=
r
2 ·
[
n+ r · (n− s)
] = δs for all ` ∈ N\S.
Hence, by differentiating (19),
∂piS
∂p`
((p¯Sj )j∈S , pN\S)
=
∑
j∈S
δs ·
[
V − (1 + r) · p¯Sj + rn ·
∑
k∈S
p¯Sk
+ rn ·
∑
k∈N\S
pk
]
+
∑
j∈S
(p¯Sj − cj) ·
[
−(1 + r) · δs
+ rn · s · δs + rn
]
= δs ·
[
s · V +
[
r·s
n − (1 + r)
]
· ∑
k∈S
p¯Sk
+ r·sn ·
∑
k∈N\S
pk
]
+
[∑
j∈S
p¯Sj − s · c¯S
]
·
[
δs ·
[
r·s
n − (1 + r)
]
+ rn
]
= δs ·
[
s · V + r·sn ·
∑
k∈N\S
pk
]
− r2·n
∑
k∈S
p¯Sk
+
[∑
j∈S
p¯Sj − s · c¯S
]
·
[ −r
2 · n +
r
n
]
= δs ·
[
s · V + r·sn ·
∑
k∈N\S
pk
]
− r·s2·n · c¯S
Concerning the solution to the minimization problem, it
follows from the first order conditions that for all ` ∈
N\S
∂piS
∂p`
((p¯Sj )j∈S , pN\S) = 0
iff δs ·
[
V + rn ·
∑
k∈N\S
pk
]
− r2·n · c¯S = 0
iff r ·
∑
k∈N\S
pk =
r
2 · c¯Sδs − n · V
Finally take care about the non-negativity constraint
for prices. This completes the proof of (8) according to
the first method.
Part 2. Second method.
For the sake of the minimization program
minpN\S∈XN\S piS((p¯Sj )j∈S , pN\S), we derive from
(5) that its objective function partially reduces as
follows: for all j ∈ S
V − (1 + r) · p¯Sj + rn ·
∑
k∈N
p¯k
= V − (1 + r) ·
[
p¯S +
cj
2
]
+ rn ·
∑
k∈S
[
p¯S +
ck
2
]
+ rn ·
∑
k∈N\S
pk
= V −
[
1 + r − s·rn
]
· p¯S − (1 + r) · cj2
+ r·s2·n · c¯S + rn ·
∑
k∈N\S
pk
= − 1n ·
[
n+ r · (n− s)
]
· p¯S − (1 + r) · cj2
+ r·s2·n · c¯S + 2n ·
[
n+ r · (n− s)
]
· p¯S
= 1n ·
[
n+ r · (n− s)
]
· p¯S − (1 + r) · cj2 + r·s2·n · c¯S
by using (6). Thus, by treating p¯S as the variable, the
6objective function is described by
piS((p¯
S
j )j∈S , pN\S)
=
∑
j∈S
(p¯Sj − cj) ·
[
V − (1 + r) · p¯Sj + rn ·
∑
k∈N
p¯k
]
=
∑
j∈S
(p¯S − cj2 ) ·
[
1
n ·
[
n+ r · (n− s)
]
· p¯S
− (1 + r) · cj2 + r·s2·n · c¯S
]
Obviously, by the latter equality, the objective function
piS((p¯j)j∈S , pN\S) is a quadratic function of p¯S , say of
the form α2 ·(p¯S)2 +α1 · p¯S+α0. Clearly, the coefficient
of the quadratic term (p¯S)2 equals α2 = sn ·
[
n+r · (n−
s)
]
> 0, while the coefficient of the term p¯S equals
α1 = −
∑
j∈S
cj · 12·n ·
[
n+ r · (n− s)
]
− 1+r2 ·
∑
j∈S
cj +
r·s2
2·n · c¯S
=
−c¯S
2 · n ·
[
s ·
[
n+ r · (n− s)
]
+ (1 + r) · s · n− r · s2
]
= −sn ·
[
n+ r · (n− s)
]
· c¯S
and the constant term α0 = 1+r4 ·
∑
j∈S
(cj)
2− r·s24·n ·(c¯S)2.
This quadratic function attains its minimum
for p¯S = −α12·α2 =
c¯S
2 or equivalently,∑
k∈N\S
pk =
1
r ·
[[
n+ r · (n− s)
]
· c¯S − n · V
]
.
Finally take care about the non-negative constraint for
prices. This completes the proof of (8) according to the
second method.
Part 3. First assumption. Suppose n · V ≤ [n + r ·
(n− s)] · c¯S . Under these circumstances, we derive from
(8) and in turn, through substitution in (6),
r ·
∑
k∈N\S
p¯k =
[
n+ r · (n− s)
]
· c¯S − n · V
as well asp¯S = c¯S2 and so,
p¯Si = p¯S +
ci
2
=
c¯S + ci
2
as well as p¯Si − ci = c¯S−ci2 for all i ∈ S.
Further, for all j ∈ S, the objective function partially
reduces as follows:
V − (1 + r) · p¯Sj + rn ·
∑
k∈N
p¯k
= V − (1 + r) · c¯S + cj
2
+ rn ·
∑
j∈S
c¯S+cj
2
+ 1n ·
[[
n+ r · (n− s)
]
· c¯S − n · V
]
= −(1 + r) · c¯S + cj
2
+ r·sn · c¯S
+ 1n ·
[
n+ r · (n− s)
]
· c¯S
Through substitution in (5), the coalitional profit reduces
as follows:
vβ(S) = piS((p¯
S
j )j∈S , p¯N\S)
=
∑
j∈S
c¯S − cj
2
·
[
−(1 + r) · c¯S + cj
2
+ r·sn · c¯S
+ 1n ·
[
n+ r · (n− s)
]
· c¯S
]
= −1+r4 ·
∑
j∈S
(c¯S − cj) · cj
= 1+r4 ·
[∑
j∈S
(cj)
2 − s · (c¯S)2
]
This proves (11) concerning the coalitional worth vβ(S).
Part 3. Second assumption. Suppose n · V > [n+ r ·
(n− s)] · c¯S . Under these circumstances, we derive from
(8) that
∑
k∈N\S
p¯k = 0, and in turn, through substitution
in (6),
p¯S =
1
2 · n·V[n+r·(n−s)]
Recall that p¯Si = p¯S +
ci
2 for all i ∈ S. Further, for all
7j ∈ S, the objective function partially reduces as follows:
V − (1 + r) · p¯Sj + rn ·
∑
k∈N
p¯k
= V − (1 + r) · (p¯S + cj2 ) + rn ·
∑
k∈S
(p¯S +
ck
2 )
= V −
[
1 + r − s·rn
]
· p¯S
+ 12 ·
[
−(1 + r) · cj + rn ·
∑
k∈S
ck
]
= V2 +
1
2 ·
[
−(1 + r) · cj + rn ·
∑
k∈S
ck
]
= 12 ·
[
V − (1 + r) · cj + r·sn · c¯S
]
Recall that p¯Sj − cj = p¯S − cj2 for all j ∈ S. Through
substitution in (5), the coalitional profit reduces as fol-
lows:
vβ(S) = piS((p¯
S
j )j∈S , p¯N\S)
= 12 ·
∑
j∈S
(p¯S − cj2 ) ·
[
V − (1 + r) · cj + r·sn · c¯S
]
=
s · p¯S
2
·
[
V + r·sn · c¯S − (1 + r) · c¯S
]
−
[
V + r·sn · c¯S
]
· s·c¯S4 + 1+r4 ·
∑
j∈S
(cj)
2
= s·V4 · 1[n+r·(n−s)] ·
[
n · V
−
[
n+ r · (n− s)
]
· c¯S
]
−
[
n · V + r · s · c¯S
]
· s · c¯S
4 · n +
1+r
4 ·
∑
j∈S
(cj)
2
= s4·n · (n·V )
2
[n+r·(n−s)] − V2 ·
∑
j∈S
cj
+ 1+r4 ·
∑
j∈S
(cj)
2 − r4·n ·
[∑
j∈S
cj
]2
This proves (14) concerning the coalitional worth vβ(S)
as well as the equivalent formula (15). 
In the context of (15), we remark, without going into
details, that, concerning the first component, and suffi-
ciently small r, the sum of individual worths approaches∑
i∈N
(V − ci)2 which always exceeds n · (V − c¯N )2 being
the worth of the grand coalition. In other words, for
r approaching to zero, the imputation set of the first
component is empty. Nevertheless, the imputation set
of the Bertrand Oligopoly Game is compensated by the
imputation set of the second zero-normalized game being
the Variance game.
Corollary 2.2: The α- and β-characteristic function
forms 〈N, vα〉 and 〈N, vβ〉 coincide, that is vα(S) =
vβ(S) for all S ⊆ N .
Proof. Fix the coalition S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅. It remains
to prove the inequality vα(S) ≥ vβ(S). We claim the
following chain of (in)equalities:
vα(S) = max
pS∈XS
min
pN\S∈XN\S
piS(pS , pN\S)
≥ min
pN\S∈XN\S
piS((p¯
S
j )j∈S , pN\S)
= piS((p¯
S
j )j∈S , p¯N\S) = vβ(S)
The last equality holds by (6) because of the con-
struction of both vectors (p¯Sj )j∈S and p¯N\S , whereas
the last equality but one is due by (8) because
p¯N\S is a minimizer of the minimization program
minpN\S∈XN\S piS((p¯Sj )j∈S , pN\S). 
III. THE CONVEXITY OF THE BERTRAND
OLIGOPOLY TU-GAME
Let P(N) = {S | S ⊆ N} denote the power set of the
player set N , consisting of all subsets of N . A cooper-
ative TU game 〈N,w〉 is called convex (supermodular)
if its characteristic function w : P(N) → R satisfies
one of the following equivalent conditions ([7]): for all
S, T ⊆ N ,
w(S) + w(T ) ≤ w(S ∪ T ) + w(S ∩ T ) or
for all i ∈ N and all S ⊆ T ⊆ N\{i},
w(S ∪ {i})− w(S) ≤ w(T ∪ {i})− w(T ) or
for all i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, and all S ⊆ N\{i, j},
w(S ∪ {i})− w(S) ≤ w(S ∪ {i, j})− w(S ∪ {j}) (20)
First of all, the next example illustrates that Bertrand
Oligopoly Games of form (11) needs not to be convex.
Example 3.1: We consider two three-firm Variance
Games
(i) Consider three almost equal marginal costs
c1 = c − 1, c2 = c and c3 = c + 1. The
zero-normalized three-firm Variance Game is
given by v({1, 2}) = v({2, 3}) = 12 and
v({1, 3}) = v({1, 2, 3}) = 2. This game is
not convex since v(N) − v({1, 3}) = 0 <
1
2 = v({1, 2}) − v({1}). The variance game
is neither average convex since the constraint∑
i∈S
[v(S) − v(S\{i})] ≤ ∑
i∈S
[v(T ) − v(T\{i})] for
all S ⊆ T ⊆ N fails to hold whenever S = {1, 3}
8and T = N .
(ii) Consider three very distinct marginal costs c1 = 1,
c2 = c+ 1 and c3 = 2 · c+ 1. The zero-normalized
three-firm Variance Game is given by v({1, 2}) =
v({2, 3}) = c22 , v({1, 3}) = v({1, 2, 3}) = 2 · c2.
Notice that this variance game equals the former
example multiplied by c2.
A TU game 〈N,w〉 is said to be non-essential
(additive) if its characteristic function w : P(N) → R
satisfies w(S) =
∑
j∈S
w({j}) for all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅.
Obviously, non-essential games are convex since
all convexity conditions are met as equalities. The
main goal of this section is to prove the convexity
(supermodularity) for Bertrand Oligopoly Games of the
form (14).
For that purpose we assume that n·V > [n+r·(n−1)]·
maxk∈N ck in order to guarantee that the constraint n ·
V > [n+r ·(n−s)]· c¯S is met by every coalition S ⊆ N ,
S 6= ∅. According to the equivalent description (14), this
type of Bertrand Oligopoly Game can be decomposed
into four types of TU games as follows: for all S ⊆ N ,
S 6= ∅,
vβ(S) =
−V
2 · w1(S)− r4·n · w2(S)
+ 1+r4 · w3(S) + V
2
4·(1+r) · w4(S) (21)
Here both games 〈N,wk〉, k = 1, 3, are non-essential
arising from the distinct marginal costs and their squares
respectively, that is w1(S) =
∑
j∈S
cj and w3(S) =∑
j∈S
(cj)
2 for all S ⊆ N . In fact, both non-essential
games are redundant for the convexity property. The
game 〈N,w2〉 is the square of the first non-essential
game 〈N,w1〉 in that w2(S) = (w1(S))2 for all S ⊆ N .
Generally speaking, the square of an non-essential game
is convex too because the marginal contribution of a fixed
player i with respect to variable coalitions S ⊆ N\{i}
are non-decreasing with respect to set inclusion, that is
w2(S ∪ {i})− w2(S)
=
[
w1(S ∪ {i})
]2
−
[
w1(S)
]2
=
[
w1(S) + w1({i})
]2
−
[
w1(S)
]2
= 2 · w1({i}) · w1(S) + (w1({i}))2 and so[
w2(S ∪ {i, j})− w2(S ∪ {j})
]
−
[
w2(S ∪ {i})− w2(S)
]
= 2 · w1({i}) · w1({j}) ≥ 0 (22)
for all i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, and all S ⊆ N\{i, j}
Lemma 3.1: Given the substitutability parameter r >
0, define the n-person game 〈N,w4〉 and the real-valued
function f : [0, 1rn )→ R by
w4(S) =
s·n·(1+r)
n+r·(n−s) for all S ⊆ N , (23)
f(x) =
x
1− rn · x for all x ∈ [0,
1
rn
), (24)
where rn = rn·(1+r)
Then the following holds:
(i) w4(S) = f(s) for all S ⊆ N with size s,
s = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n and f(n) = n · (1 + r)
(ii) The function f : R → R is strictly increasing and
strictly convex on the interval [0, 1rn ) and conse-
quently, the game 〈N,w4〉 is strictly convex in that
f(s+ 2)− f(s+ 1) > f(s+ 1)− f(s) (25)
for all s = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n− 2
(iii) The marginal returns of the function f satisfy
f(s+ 1)− f(s)
=
n2 · (1 + r)2
[n+ r · (n− s)] · [n+ r · (n− 1− s)](26)
(iv) Applying (26) twice yields[
f(s+ 2)− f(s+ 1)
]
−
[
f(s+ 1)− f(s)
]
= 2 · r · n2 · (1 + r)2 · [n+ r · (n− s)]−1
· [n+ r · (n− 1− s)]−1 · [n+ r · (n− 2− s)]−1
(27)
(v) vβ(S) = 1+r4 ·
[
V
1+r
·f(s)−s·c¯S
]2
f(s) +
1+r
4 · V ARC(S)
provided f(s) > (1+r)·sV · c¯S
Proof. Let S ⊆ N be of size s, s = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n.
From (23)-(24), we derive
f(s) =
s
1− rn · s =
s
1− r·sn·(1+r)
=
s · n · (1 + r)
n · (1 + r)− r · s =
s · n · (1 + r)
n+ r · (n− s) = w4(S)
9So,
V
1+r · f(s)− s · c¯S = s·n·Vn+r·(n−s) − s · c¯S
= s ·
[
n · V
n+ r · (n− s) − c¯S
]
Together with (15)-(16), this completes the proof of the
coalitional worth vβ(S). It is left to the reader to verify
that the first and second derivative of the differentiable
function f(x) are given by f ′(x) = 1(1−rn·x)2 > 0 as well
as f ′′(x) = 2·rn(1−rn·x)3 > 0. Recall that a differentiable
function is convex if and only if the second derivative is
non-negative. 
In summary, so far, all four games 〈N,wk〉, k =
1, 2, 3, 4, are convex (where the two non-essential games
are redundant for the convexity property). Because the
Bertrand Oligopoly Game of the form (21) is the dif-
ference of two convex games, it may fail to be convex
itself. According to the proof of the next main theorem,
convexity still holds for the Bertrand Oligopoly Game
due to the existence of the underlying constraints.
Theorem 3.1: Suppose n · V > [n + r · (n − 1)] ·
maxk∈N ck. Then the Bertrand Oligopoly Game 〈N, vβ〉
of the form (21) is convex (supermodular).
Proof. In view of the decomposition (21), the Bertrand
Oligopoly Game is convex if and only if the game
〈N,n · V 2 ·w4 − r · (1 + r) ·w2〉 is convex. By Lemma
3.1(i), w4(S) = f(s) for all S ⊆ N , whereas (22)
holds in the setting of the game 〈N,w2〉 satisfying
w2({k}) = ck for all k ∈ N . In summary, the convexity
property (20) applies to the Bertrand Oligopoly Game if
and only if the following holds: for all i, j ∈ N , i 6= j,
and all s = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n− 2,[
f(s+ 2)− f(s+ 1)
]
−
[
f(s+ 1)− f(s)
]
≥ r · (1 + r)
n · V 2 ·
[
2 · ci · cj
]
(28)
By assumption, ck ≤ n·Vn+r·(n−1) for k ∈ {i, j} and thus,
it suffices to prove[
f(s+ 2)− f(s+ 1)
]
−
[
f(s+ 1)− f(s)
]
≥ 2 · n · r · (1 + r)
[n+ r · (n− 1)]2 (29)
Recall the function f(x) = x·n·(1+r)n+r·(n−x) and the results
(26)–(27). Note that the expression at the right hand of
(27) is non-decreasing in the variable coalition size s,
attaining its minimum at s = 0. It follows that
[
f(s+ 2)− f(s+ 1)
]
−
[
f(s+ 1)− f(s)
]
≥ 2 · r · n
2 · (1 + r)2
[n+ r · n] · [n+ r · (n− 1)] · [n+ r · (n− 2)]
=
2 · r · n · (1 + r)
[n+ r · (n− 1)] · [n+ r · (n− 2)]
≥ 2 · n · r · (1 + r)
[n+ r · (n− 1)]2
This completes the proof of convexity for the Bertrand
Oligopoly Game. 
With the specific choice (24) of the convex function f
in mind, (29) is a sufficient condition for the convexity
notion applied to the Bertrand Oligopoly Game of the
form (21). Under the transformation g(x) = rn · f(x),
we have that (29) is fully equivalent to
[
g(s+ 2)− g(s+ 1)
]
−
[
g(s+ 1)− g(s)
]
≥ 2 · (g(1))2
(30)
Hence, in the framework of any not yet specified function
g : R → R, the convexity of g together with (30), are
sufficient for the convexity of the Bertrand Oligopoly
Game of the form vβ(S) = −r4·n · w2(S) + V
2
4 · nr · g(s)
for all S ⊆ N .
Proposition 3.1: The Variance game 〈N,V ARC〉 of
(15) is not convex, unless all the firms have the same
marginal costs yielding the zero game.
Proof. Suppose that at least two firms (but not all the
firms) have the same marginal cost, say cost c. Let E
denote the set of firms with the constant marginal cost
c, that is E = {i ∈ N | ci = c}. By assumption, 2 ≤
|E| < n. Obviously, c¯S = c and thus, V ARC(S) = 0
for every S ⊆ E. For every S ⊆ N satisfying S 6⊆ E, it
holds
c¯(S) = 1s ·
∑
k∈S
ck =
1
s ·
[
|S ∩ E| · c+ ∑
k∈S\E
ck
]
= c+ 1s ·
∑
k∈S\E
(ck − c) and so,
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V ARC(S) =
∑
k∈S∩E
[
c− c¯S
]2
+
∑
k∈S\E
[
ck − c¯S
]2
=
∑
k∈S∩E
(−δS)2 +
∑
k∈S\E
[
ck − c− δS
]2
(where δS = 1s ·
∑
k∈S\E
(ck − c))
=
∑
k∈S∩E
(δS)
2 +
∑
k∈S\E
[
ck − c
]2
−
∑
k∈S\E
2 · δS ·
[
ck − c
]
+
∑
k∈S\E
(δS)
2
= s · (δS)2 +
∑
k∈S\E
[
ck − c
]2
− 2 · s · (δS)2
=
∑
k∈S\E
[
ck − c
]2
− s · (δS)2
=
∑
k∈S\E
[
ck − c
]2
− 1s ·
[ ∑
k∈S\E
(ck − c)
]2
For all i ∈ E, and all S ⊆ N\{i} satisfying S 6⊆ E, it
holds that S ∪ {i} 6⊆ E as well as (S ∪ {i})\E = S\E.
From this, together with the latter equality, we derive on
the one hand
V ARC(S ∪ {i})− V ARC(S)
=
[ −1
s+ 1
+
1
s
]
·
[ ∑
k∈S\E
(ck − c)
]2
= 1s·(s+1) ·
[ ∑
k∈S\E
(ck − c)
]2
Similarly, for all i, j ∈ E, and all S ⊆ N\{i, j}
satisfying S 6⊆ E, it holds that S ∪ {i, j} 6⊆ E as well
as (S ∪ {i, j})\E = (S ∪ {j})\E = S\E and so, we
derive on the other
V ARC(S ∪ {i, j})− V ARC(S ∪ {j})
= 1(s+1)·(s+2) ·
[ ∑
k∈S\E
(ck − c)
]2
To complete the proof, choose i, j ∈ E. i 6= j, as well as
any ` ∈ N\E. The former two equalities apply to S =
{`} since S 6⊆ E. Then the strict inequalty V ARC(S ∪
{i, j})−V ARC(S∪{j}) < V ARC(S∪{i})−V ARC(S)
holds due to (s + 1) · (s + 2) > s · (s + 1) as well as[ ∑
k∈S\E
(ck − c)
]2
=
[
c` − c
]2
> 0. 
IV. THE SHAPLEY VALUE OF THE BERTRAND
OLIGOPOLY TU-GAME
The decomposition (21) of the Bertrand Oligopoly
Game 〈N, vβ〉 into four types of games permits to
determine its Shapley value Sh(N, vβ) on basis of its
linearity, efficiency, symmetry, and strategic equivalence.
Generally speaking, the Shapley value Sh(N,w) =
(Shi(N,w))i∈N of an arbitrary game 〈N,w〉 is given
by an appropriate weighted, probabilistic sum of player’s
marginal contributions of the form w(S ∪ {i})− w(S),
S ⊆ N\{i}, that is ([8]),for all i ∈ N
Shi(N,w) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
pn(s)·
[
w(S∪{i})−w(S)
]
(31)
where pn(s) = 1n·(n−1s )
for all s = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n − 1.
Due to its probabilistic interpretation, the Shapley value
of any non-essential game 〈N,w〉 equals the individual’s
worth w({i}), i ∈ N . Moreover, because of anonimity
and efficiency, the Shapley value of the symmetric game
〈N,w4〉 is fully determined by Shi(N,w4) = w4(N)n =
1 + r for all i ∈ N . Fourthly, the computation of the
Shapley value of the game 〈N,w2〉 proceeds by using
(22) yielding for all i ∈ N
Shi(N,w2) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
pn(s) ·
[
(ci)
2 + 2 · ci ·
∑
j∈S
cj
]
= (ci)
2 + 2 · ci · pn(s) ·
∑
S⊆N\{i}
∑
j∈S
cj
Through the inverse order
∑
j∈N\{i}
cj ·
∑
S⊆N\{i}.
S3j
pn(s),
together with two combinatorial steps, we arrive at
Shi(N,w2) = ci ·
∑
j∈N cj = n · ci · c¯N . Finally, by
applying the linearity of the Shapley value, we conclude
the following:
Theorem 4.1: The Shapley value of the Bertrand
Oligopoly Game of the form (21) is given by
Shi(N, vβ) =
−V
2 · ci− r4·n ·n · ci · c¯N + 1+r4 · (ci)2 + V
2
4
(32)
In short, Shi(N, vβ) =
(V−ci)2
4 +
r
4 · ci · (ci− c¯N ) for all
i ∈ N .
In words, the Shapley value of the Bertrand Oligopoly
Game involves two types of payoffs to each firm i, i ∈
N , namely the square of the netto demand intercept V −
ci, as well as a proportional part ci of the firm’s deviation
ci − c¯N from the average grand coalitional cost.
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Theorem 4.2: The Shapley value of the Variance TU
game 〈N,V ARC〉 of the form (15) is given by
Shi(N,V ARC) = an · c¯+in − bn · c¯−in where (33)
c¯+in =
∑
j∈N\{i}
(ci − cj)2
n− 1 (34)
c¯−in =
∑
{j,k}⊆N\{i},
j 6=k
(cj − ck)2(
n−1
2
) (35)
an =
n−Hn
n
and bn =
n+1
2 −Hn
n
(36)
Hn =
n∑
k=1
1
k
(37)
Lemma 4.1: The game representation of the Variance
TU game 〈N,V ARC〉 of the form (15) with respect to
the basis of unanimity games {(N, uT ) | T ⊆ N,T 6= ∅}
is given by
V ARC =
∑
T⊆N,
T 6=∅
λV ART · uT (38)
where λV ART =
(−1)t
2 ·
∑
{j,k}⊆T,
j 6=k
(cj−ck)2
(t2)
if t ≥ 2, while
λV AR{j} = 0 for all j ∈ N .
Proof of Lemma 4.1 Through substitution of λV ART ,
T ⊆ N , T 6= ∅, we show that for all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅,
V ARC(S) =
∑
T⊆N,
T 6=∅
λV ART · uT (S) (39)
or equivalently,V ARC(S) =
∑
T⊆S,
t≥2
λV ART .
Let S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅. For one-person coalitions S = {j},
j ∈ N , the latter equality holds because of λV AR{j} = 0 =
V ARC({j}). In the remainder, let s ≥ 2. On the one
hand, we obtain the following chain of equations.
∑
T⊆S,
t≥2
λV ART =
∑
T⊆S,
t≥2
(−1)t
t · (t− 1) ·
∑
{j,k}⊆T,
j 6=k
(cj − ck)2
=
∑
{j,k}⊆S,
j 6=k
(cj − ck)2 ·
∑
T⊆S,
{j,k}⊆T
(−1)t
t · (t− 1)
=
∑
{j,k}⊆S,
j 6=k
(cj − ck)2 ·
s∑
t=2
(
s− 2
t− 2
)
· (−1)
t
t · (t− 1)
=
∑
{j,k}⊆S,
j 6=k
(cj − ck)2 ·
s∑
t=2
(
s
t
)
· (−1)t · 1
s · (s− 1)
= 1s·(s−1) ·
∑
{j,k}⊆S,
j 6=k
(cj − ck)2
·
[ s∑
t=0
(
s
t
)
· (−1)t −
(
s
0
)
+
(
s
1
)]
=
1
s · (s− 1) ·
∑
{j,k}⊆S,
j 6=k
(cj − ck)2
·
[
((−1) + 1)s − 1 + s
]
= 1s ·
∑
{j,k}⊆S,
j 6=k
(cj − ck)2
On the other hand,
V ARC(S) =
∑
j∈S
[
cj − c¯(S)
]2
=
∑
j∈S
[
(cj)
2 + (c¯(S))2 − 2 · cj · c¯(S)
]
=
∑
j∈S
(cj)
2 − s · (c¯(S))2
=
∑
j∈S
(cj)
2 − 1s ·
[∑
j∈S
cj
]2
=
∑
j∈S
(cj)
2 − 1s ·
[∑
j∈S
(cj)
2 + 2 · ∑
{j,k}⊆S,
j 6=k
cj · ck
]
= s−1s ·
∑
j∈S
(cj)
2 − 2s ·
∑
{j,k}⊆S,
j 6=k
cj · ck
= 1s ·
∑
j∈S
(s− 1) · (cj)2 − 2s ·
∑
{j,k}⊆S,
j 6=k
cj · ck
= 1s ·
∑
{j,k}⊆S,
j 6=k
[
(cj)
2 + (ck)
2 − 2 · cj · ck
]
= 1s ·
∑
{j,k}⊆S,
j 6=k
(cj − ck)2
Both parts yield (39) for all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, and
consequently, (38) holds. 
Proof of Theorem 4.2
Recall the well-known fact that the Shapley value of any
unanimity game is determined by Shi(N, uT ) = 0 for
all i ∈ N\T , whereas Shi(N, uT ) = 1t for all i ∈ T .
Together with the linearity of the Shapley value and the
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game representation (38) of the Variance TU game, it
follows that its Shapley value is given by, for all i ∈ N ,
Shi(N,V ARC) =
∑
T⊆N,
T 6=∅
λV ART · Shi(N, uT )
=
∑
T⊆N,
i∈T
λV ART
t
=
∑
T⊆N,t≥2,
i∈T
(−1)t
2 · t ·
∑
{j,k}⊆T,
j 6=k
(cj − ck)2(
t
2
)
=
∑
T⊆N,t≥2,
i∈T
(−1)t
t2 · (t− 1) ·
∑
{j,k}⊆T,
j 6=k
(cj − ck)2
=
∑
{j,k}⊆N,
j 6=k
(cj − ck)2 ·
∑
T⊆N,i∈T,
{j,k}⊆T
(−1)t
t2 · (t− 1)
Given any pair {j, k} ⊆ N , and player i ∈ N , we
distinguish two cases. If i ∈ {j, k}, then
∑
T⊆N,i∈T,
{j,k}⊆T
(−1)t
t2 · (t− 1) =
∑
T⊆N,
{j,k}⊆T
(−1)t
t2 · (t− 1)
=
n∑
t=2
(
n− 2
t− 2
)
· (−1)
t
t2 · (t− 1)
=
1
n · (n− 1) ·
n∑
t=2
(
n
t
)
· (−1)
t
t
=
1
n− 1 +
1
n · (n− 1) ·
n∑
t=1
(
n
t
)
· (−1)
t
t
=
1
n− 1 +
1
n · (n− 1) · αn =
n+ αn
n · (n− 1)
where αn =
n∑
t=1
(
n
t
) · (−1)tt . If i 6∈ {j, k}, then
∑
T⊆N,i∈T,
{j,k}⊆T
(−1)t
t2 · (t− 1)
=
∑
T⊆N,
{i,j,k}⊆T
(−1)t
t2 · (t− 1) =
n∑
t=3
(
n− 3
t− 3
)
· (−1)
t
t2 · (t− 1)
=
1
n · (n− 1) · (n− 2) ·
n∑
t=3
(
n
t
)
· t− 2
t
· (−1)t
=
−1
(n− 1) · (n− 2)
+
1
n · (n− 1) · (n− 2) ·
n∑
t=1
(
n
t
)
· t− 2
t
· (−1)t
=
−1
(n− 1) · (n− 2) −
1
n · (n− 1) · (n− 2)
+
1
n · (n− 1) · (n− 2) ·
[
−2 ·
n∑
t=1
(
n
t
)
· (−1)
t
t
+
n∑
t=0
(
n
t
)
· (−1)t
]
=
−(n+ 1)
n · (n− 1) · (n− 2) +
−2 · αn + ((−1) + 1)n
n · (n− 1) · (n− 2)
=
−(n+ 1)− 2 · αn
n · (n− 1) · (n− 2)
We arrive at
Shi(N,V ARC)
=
∑
{j,k}⊆N,j 6=k,
i∈{j,k}
(cj − ck)2 · n+ αn
n · (n− 1)
−
∑
{j,k}⊆N,j 6=k,
i6∈{j,k}
(cj − ck)2 · (n+ 1) + 2 · αn
n · (n− 1) · (n− 2)
It remains to pove that the sequence αn =
n∑
t=1
(
n
t
) (−1)t
t
agrees with αn = −
n∑
k=1
1
k . It is left for the reader to
check that the recursive relationship αn+1 = αn − 1n+1
holds by using the combinatorial relationship
(
n+1
t
)
=(
n
t
)
+
(
n
t−1
)
for all 0 ≤ t ≤ n. Together with α1 =
−1, the claim follows immediately. This completes the
full proof of formula (34) for the Shapley value of the
Variance TU game. 
V. TOTALLY BALANCEDNESS OF THE BERTRAND
OLIGOPOLY TU-GAME
An arbitrary game 〈N,w〉 with characteristic function
w : P(N) → R is said to be balanced if it holds∑
S∈B
λS ·w(S) ≤ w(N) for every balanced collection B ⊆
P(N) of coalitions and corresponding weights (λS)S∈B
satisfying λS > 0 for all S ∈ B and
∑
S∈B,
S3i
λS = 1 for all
i ∈ N .
Theorem 5.1: The Variance TU game 〈N,V ARC〉 of
the form (15) is balanced (and hence, its core is non-
empty)
Proof. Let B be a balanced collection of coalitions
S, S ∈ B, with corresponding weights λS > 0, S ∈
B, satisfying ∑
S∈B,
S3i
λS = 1 for all i ∈ N . By various
appropriate computations we obtain the following chain
of equalities:
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∑
S∈B
λS · V ARC(S) =
∑
S∈B
λS ·
∑
i∈S
[
ci − c¯S
]2
=
∑
i∈N
∑
S∈B,
S3i
λS ·
[
ci − c¯S
]2
=
∑
i∈N
∑
S∈B,
S3i
λS ·
[
(ci − c¯N ) + (c¯N − c¯S)
]2
=
∑
i∈N
∑
S∈B,
S3i
λS ·
[
(ci − c¯N )2 + (c¯N − c¯S)2
+ 2 · (ci − c¯N ) · (c¯N − c¯S)
]
=
∑
i∈N
∑
S∈B,
S3i
λS ·
[
ci − c¯N
]2
+
∑
i∈N
∑
S∈B,
S3i
λS
·
[
(c¯N − c¯S)2 + 2 · (ci − c¯N ) · (c¯N − c¯S)
]
=
∑
i∈N
[
ci − c¯N
]2
·
∑
S∈B,
S3i
λS +
∑
i∈N
∑
S∈B,
S3i
λS
·
[
c¯N − c¯S
]
·
[
(c¯N − c¯S) + 2 · (ci − c¯N )
]
=
∑
i∈N
[
ci − c¯N
]2
+
∑
S∈B
∑
i∈S
λS
·
[
c¯N − c¯S
]
·
[
2 · ci − c¯N − c¯S
]
= V ARC(N) +
∑
S∈B
λS · (c¯N − c¯S)
·
∑
i∈S
[
2 · ci − c¯S − c¯N
]
= V ARC(N) +
∑
S∈B
λS
· (c¯N − c¯S) ·
[
2 · s · c¯S − s · c¯S − s · c¯N
]
= V ARC(N) +
∑
S∈B
λS
· (c¯N − c¯S) ·
[
s · (c¯S − c¯N )
]
= V ARC(N)−
∑
S∈B
λS · s ·
[
c¯N − c¯S
]2
≤ V ARC(N)
Because every subgame of the Bertrand Oligopoly
Game is of the same type (associated with the same data
restricted to the new player set), the Bertrand Oligopoly
Game is called totally balanced (and so, every subgame
has a non-emepty core).
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Bertrand Oligopoly situation with Shubik’s de-
mand functions has been modelled as a cooperative
TU-game in [5], but only with reference to identical
marginal costs for all firms. The current paper continues
to study the general situation with distinct marginal
costs. The complexity of the description of the associated
cooperative game, as a result of solving two subsequent
optimization problems, is compensated by decomposing
the Bertrand Oligopoly Game into four types of games,
namely two non-essential games, one symmetric game,
and the square of one of these non-essential games. Al-
though it concerns the difference of two convex games,
it is shown that the Bertrand Oligopoly Game is convex
too. Its current proof technique by decomposition differs
from Lardon’s proof of convexity for the symmetrical
Bertrand Oligopoly Game. Surprisingly, under certain
circumstances, the Bertrand Oligopoly Game agrees with
the fundamental notion in statistics called Variance with
respect to the distinct marginal costs. In the symmetric
Bertrand Oligopoly Game this variance degenerates into
the trivial zero game.
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